IZVORNI ZNANSTVENI ČLANAK / ORIGINAL SCIENTIFIC ARTICLE
DOI: 10.62125/2303-6826.2023.26.94-95.85
UDK 316.647.8
Author
Asim Delibašić
Abstract
This paper discusses the problem of “moral prejudice” in a democratic society. Moral prejudice is presented as an integral part of the moral norm that is contained in the “social contract” of every nation, which equally implies both written laws and customs of the people. The new, “liberal” moral system, which advocates freedom as the fulfillment of the maximum of human possibilities, and includes as praiseworthy things that the traditional system rejected, is not devoid of prejudice. On the contrary, it comes with a new “prejudice” according to which all traditional morality should be discarded, with extreme condemnation, as oppressive. New moral norms, which did not exist as such in laws and customs, are often imposed by judicial interpretations of key rights and freedoms of citizens. Very often these judicial interpretations rest on the very antipodes of traditional morality and prevailing popular sentiment, so that they come as a fundamental opposition to the “social contract” based on the consent of the people through past, present and future generations. These efforts to impose a new moral system on everyone, regardless of their will, are essentially paternalistic and violent. The true task of a free society is to create pluralism in which different groups will have their right to their own moral system, and in which a new prejudice will not arise under the guise of a universal measure of good human life, which ignores diversity in human experience and worldviews.
Key words
positive liberty, negative liberty, social contract, moral prejudice, sexual morality